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1 Introduction
Executives, and as a result corporations, are sometimes described as un-
dertaking inappropriate levels of risks March and Shapira (1987), often in
the direction of excessive risk taking. Prominent recent examples, especially
in the banking industry, are painfully easy to retrieve. Many explanations
have been proposed to account for this observation, but very few have ex-
plored the role of the mere fact that decisions by managers are (by the very
nature of corporations) taking place in a social context. Indeed, models of
decision making under risk abstract from the social environment in which
decisions are made: the typical situation studied by decision theory is one
where the individual makes a choice with neither any influence on others nor
any information on others’ situations. The empirical and experimental evi-
dence on decision under risk involving a social component is sparse at best
until now (exceptions include Bault, Coricelli, and Rustichini, 2008; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2010; Cooper and Rege, 2011; Lahno and Serra-Garcia, 2012;
and Linde and Sonnemans, 2012b).1 Hence, it may very well be that deci-
sions under risk in social environments differ from the equivalent decisions
taken in purely individual contexts. At least two phenomena suggest an im-
portant role of the social context in risky decisions: first, broadly speaking,
it has been shown that preferences depend heavily on theoretically ‘irrele-
vant’ aspects of the environment or context (Tversky and Simonson, 1993);
second, there is ample evidence that individuals are sensitive in many ways
to others’ situations (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Frank, 2005).
Social influence on decision under risk is likely to be relevant in many
economic and organizational contexts. The most obvious examples are pro-
vided by tightly knit social structures such as corporations or families. It is
even difficult to find social-context-free risky decisions: decisions under risk
taken by managers have consequences for other organizational members; fi-
nancial decisions in a family impact on all family members; peers’ attitudes
or decisions might influence decision makers; even at the roulette table or
when playing lotteries social influences have an impact on decisions. More
specifically, in an organizational context, a manager lagging behind her peers
in terms of performance will not necessarily make the same choice as her
counterpart in the opposite situation. In companies, social context may play
a particularly important role where individual performance-based payment
is prevalent (Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent, 2009), since it generates addi-
tional opportunities for social comparison. This might be especially relevant
1An overview is provided in Trautmann and Vieider (2012).
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for professional traders who hardly ever work in isolation: trading rooms
tend to be crowded workplaces, overloaded with information about oth-
ers’ performance, and vibrant with intensive social exchange about market
trends, relative success of colleagues, individual bonuses and so on (Cetina
and Preda, 2006). As a consequence, the standard individualistic approach
in decision theory requires to be complemented by social aspects.
Despite its potential relevance the effect of social context in risk taking
has only received limited attention in the experimental literature on decision
under risk: Following the burgeoning of studies on other-regarding prefer-
ences that focused on deterministic outcomes, empirical research has started
to explore the issue of the interaction of risk and social concerns (Bolton,
Brandts, and Ockenfels, 2005; Brennan, Gu¨th, Gonzalez, and Levati, 2008;
Krawczyk and Le Lec, 2010). Some of the relevant studies explicitly focus on
peer effects in decision making under risk (Cooper and Rege, 2011; Cai, 2012;
Bursztyn, Ederer, Ferman, and Yuchtman, 2012; Lahno and Serra-Garcia,
2012), but very few studies have focused on the effects of social comparison
on risk attitudes. The existing evidence seems rather mixed: Linde and Son-
nemans (2012a) provide evidence that decision makers are more risk averse
when in a socially unfavorable situation than in a socially favorable one. In
contrast, Bault, Coricelli, and Rustichini (2008) and Bolton and Ockenfels
(2010) come to the opposite conclusion, i.e., that decision makers are less
risk averse when the situation is unfavorable and vice versa.
Our main focus here is on resource allocation. Consider a decision maker
who can either implement a certain allocation of the resource between herself
and a second individual (henceforth denoted ’receiver’) or use a random
device to allocate the entire resource to either herself or to the receiver. More
precisely, the choice is between either splitting the resource (dividing the pie
into shares of x % and 100 − x % for the decision maker and the receiver,
respectively) or using a random draw to allocate it (whereby the chances to
get the entire pie are x % and 100 − x %, respectively). Importantly, x is
fixed for a given decision. Such a setup reproduces, in a simplified manner,
important aspects of many situations that involve risk: a decision maker
can either go for a given allocation (of financial resources, of power, or of
positions) or gamble for the entire pie. For instance, a manager can accept
the proposed split of available funding between her and another’s project
or argue that the company should focus on just one of them; a political
leader may have a choice between accommodating the current division of
power within her party between herself and a rival or go for a shootout that
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will leave just one of the two standing; a poker player can decide between
accepting the current bets or go all in for the pot. In short, we capture
a competitive situation for a resource, and by systematically varying the
given x, it is possible to analyze risk attitudes depending on the status quo
of the deterministic division of the resource. Socially favorable situations are
defined as those where x is greater than 50 %: for instance with x = 70, the
decision maker has to choose between (OPTION A) a deterministic division
giving 70 % of the resource for herself and 30 % of the resource for the
receiver and (OPTION B) the gamble involving a 70 % chance of receiving
the entire resource for herself and the remaining 30 % of losing the entire
resource to the receiver. Consequently, unfavorable situations are those in
which x is smaller than 50 %.
It is worth noticing already at this stage that risk averse decision makers
would always go for the deterministic option for a given x. Predictions for
outcome-based other-regarding preferences depend on the specification. Ex
ante, the two options are equal implying indifference; ex post, the gamble
option is always creating the maximum inequality (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), indicating that inequity aversion should lead
to a preference for the deterministic option, whereas efficiency concerns have
no bearing on decisions because efficiency is constant (Charness and Rabin,
2002). Purely intention-based models of other-regarding preferences (Rabin,
1993) are not applicable because the receiver has no influence on the out-
come. Procedural or process fairness could be relevant for the decision, but
in contrast to Machina’s 1989 mom example the resource is not indivisible
in our case (Trautmann, 2009; Trautmann and Wakker, 2010). Here, if pro-
cedural concerns are based on expected payoff, a rather natural assumption,
they should be neutral in the decision: in all cases, both options provide
the same expected payoff to both individuals. Hence, all outcome-based
approaches tend towards indifference or a preference for the deterministic
option, whereas procedural concerns can be expected to play little role.
Since the size of the pie or the exact controlled situation of the choice
between the two options can hardly be observed within companies in a way
that would allow for a rigorous empirical assessment, we ran laboratory ex-
periments. The main findings from these experiments can be summarized as
follows: although we find that in most cases a majority of subjects prefer the
deterministic division of the resource, we observe that elicited risk attitude
is substantially affected by social context. More specifically, subjects seem
to be clearly more risk-seeking when the deterministic option involves unfa-
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vorable inequity and, more surprisingly, also when the deterministic option
implies perfect equality of payoffs, in comparison with an equivalent task in
a purely individual context. In contrast, a favorable social context (when
the deterministic option corresponds to favorable inequity) seems to reduce
the willingness to take risks. The analysis at the individual level suggests
that most of this asymmetry is driven by about one fourth of subjects who
strongly exhibit this pattern of choices. The behavior of many participants
seem to be driven by a social reference point: if the deterministic situation
is favorable or at least equal, procedural concerns may have the strongest
impact on behavior. If the deterministic situation is unfavorable, many par-
ticipants seem to be guided by a strong aversion against disadvantageous
inequality. More generally, the main features of prospect theory - risk aver-
sion in the gain domain and risk seeking in the loss domain - seems to carry
over to social decision making with a social reference point.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section
presents the experimental design, the third one exposes the results, while the
last part discusses the results in the light of existing literature and concludes.
2 Design and procedures
The experiment was divided into three parts: a series of risky choices in
social context, two dictator games, and a series of individual decisions under
risk. The first part is the core of the study and aims at measuring how risk
attitude is affected by social contexts, whereas the latter two provide a
control for social concerns and risk attitude in a purely individual context.
2.1 Part 1: risk attitude in varying social contexts
In the first part of the experiment, subjects faced tasks where fifty euros
have to be allocated (either deterministically or randomly) between the de-
cision maker and the receiver. Two options were available: the deterministic
division of the 50 euros, i.e. (x, 50 − x) for a given x (OPTION A) and a
social lottery where the decision maker has a probability of x/50 of getting
the 50 euros, and the receiver has a probability of (50 − x)/50 of getting
them, with the same x (OPTION B). These chances were mutually exclu-
sive, so that either the decision maker or the receiver would obtain the entire
amount. The social lottery corresponding to this second option can hence
be written as:
(
x
50
, (50, 0); 50−x
50
, (0, 50)
)
. The options were systematically
varied to obtain nine different tasks, with x ranging from 5 to 45 euros in
steps of 5 euros. Table 1 displays all tasks subjects faced. Participants were
asked whether they preferred Option A (henceforth also referred to as ‘the
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safe option’) or Option B (henceforth also ‘the risky option’). They could
also indicate indifference. In that case they knew that Option A or Option
B would be implemented randomly with equal probability. Each subject
was asked to make a choice in each row. Order effects were controlled for
by presenting the choices in ascending orders to half the subjects and in
descending order to the other half.
Task Safe option (in euros) Risky option (chances of winning the 50 euros)
T5 5 for chooser, 45 for receiver p=10% for chooser, 1-p=90% for receiver
T10 10 for chooser, 40 for receiver p=20% for chooser, 1-p=80% for receiver
T15 15 for chooser, 35 for receiver p=30% for chooser, 1-p=70% for receiver
T20 20 for chooser, 30 for receiver p=40% for chooser, 1-p=60% for receiver
T25 25 for chooser, 25 for receiver p=50% for chooser, 1-p=50% for receiver
T30 30 for chooser, 20 for receiver p=60% for chooser, 1-p=40% for receiver
T35 35 for chooser, 15 for receiver p=70% for chooser, 1-p=30% for receiver
T40 40 for chooser, 10 for receiver p=80% for chooser, 1-p=20% for receiver
T45 45 for chooser, 5 for receiver p=90% for chooser, 1-p=10% for receiver
Table 1: Part 1: Social tasks
By keeping expected payoff constant in each row, we do not allow for a
purely selfish choice. Given that in the standard dictator game (Forsythe,
Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton, 1994) only a fraction of people transfer money
to the receiver and that the distribution of transfers is usually very skewed,
we would have been left with a small number of observations for only a sub-
set of the action space, had we allowed to choose x freely. Furthermore, our
empirical analysis is simplified, because we do not have to take selfishness
as a motive into account. Choices are simple and binary, involving no com-
petition nor interaction between the decision maker and the receiver. As a
consequence, the choice and the relative ex post payoff cannot be interpreted
as signals of underlying abilities of subjects (e.g. intelligence or effort). In a
similar vein, using repeated tasks with observation of the other’s choice or
performance can have some effects not because of social comparison per se
but because of social learning. All that is precluded by our design.
2.2 Parts 2 and 3: controls for individual risk preferences
and risk-free social preferences
The remaining parts of the experiment aim at measuring both risk prefer-
ence in an individual setting (without social context) and social preferences
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(in a risk-free environment).
More precisely, in the second part of the experiment, subjects had to play
two dictator games (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton, 1994; Bolton,
Zwick, and Katok, 1998): The first one was a regular dictator game with
50 euros to be divided between the decision maker (the dictator) and the
receiver. The second game consisted of dividing chances to win 50 euros
(that is the ‘competitive probabilistic dictator game’ of Krawczyk and Le Lec
2010). Finally, participants had to indicate which of the two games they
preferred. The two dictator games provide us with controls for outcome-
based (first game) and procedural social concerns (second game). Thus, we
have a measure of subjects’ concerns for others to potentially identify the
role they may have played in the main part of the experiment.
The final part of the experiment consists of a series of nine binary de-
cisions under risk. The first three were a truncated and adapted Holt and
Laury (2002) procedure to estimate subjects’ risk attitudes with stakes com-
parable to the one used in the main part of our experiment. The next three
tasks were aimed at measuring loss aversion, and the last three ones were
risky binary choices that were exactly equivalent to T15, T25 and T35 in
Table 1, but without any social component (denoted T15i, T25i, and T35i,
henceforth). They allow for a direct comparison between risk attitudes with
and without social context. Finally, subjects were asked to provide some
socio-demographic characteristics.
2.3 Experimental procedures
The design described above was implemented as a classroom experiment
with 82 undergraduates in economics at the University of Munich. All of
them were asked to take all the choices described above. Their role - either
decision maker or receiver - was determined after the experiment, using
the so-called strategy method. Decision sheets and instructions were first
distributed for parts 1 and 2 together, and upon finishing, also for part 3, and
subjects knew that there were exactly three parts of the experiments right
from the start of it. Four randomly selected decision makers were matched
with four randomly selected receivers. For each pair one of the ‘social’ tasks
(parts one and two, including the question regarding their preference for the
regular dictator game or the probabilistic one) was randomly selected for
payment. In addition, four participants were randomly picked for payment in
the individual lottery part, where one task was once again randomly picked
to be implemented. Random devices were run by the selected participants.
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Payments were provided individually and confidentially. All design details
and the procedural details were common knowledge among participants.
3 Results
3.1 Aggregated results
An overview of the results in the social decisions under risk (part 1 of the
experiment) is shown in Table 2.
Task Safe option Indifference Risky option
T5 36.59 18.29 45.12
T10 50.00 14.63 35.37
T15 59.76 13.41 26.83
T20 64.63 8.54 26.83
T25 64.63 13.41 21.95
T30 78.05 10.98 10.98
T35 70.73 6.10 23.17
T40 64.63 7.32 28.05
T45 58.54 6.10 35.37
Table 2: Percentage of participants choosing each option in the risky social
tasks
The overall picture is perhaps easier to see by looking at Figure 1. The
aggregate pattern is U-shaped, with subjects seemingly willing to take more
risk in unequal tasks both in very favorable and very unfavorable situations.2
The level of risk taking reaches its lowest value just above the equal split.
The U-shape of the safe choice contingent on the task is at first sight
a somewhat surprising finding: the relative level of risk aversion seems to
decrease with the extent of favorable inequity. When inequity is large but
favorable, some decision makers seem to prefer to give some chance to the
2The U-shaped form is confirmed by a very simple quadratic regression model (n = 9)
with overall frequency of the risky option as dependent variable and own payoff in the
safe option (straight and squared) as independent variables. Both variables turn out
to be highly significant, the model has adjusted R2 of .88, and the predicted function
smoothly follows the data. It is worth noting that the residuals for T25 and T30 are by
far the largest, their squares accounting for 86% of sum of squared errors, suggesting some
discontinuity there (see below). In contrast, if the squared term is omitted, adjusted R2
drops to .19, and the regression does not reach conventional levels of significance.
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Black: safe option. Light grey: risky option. Grey: Indifference.
Figure 1: Distribution of choices
receiver, even so small, rather than to give ‘alms’. This cannot be explained
by standard probability weighting functions of Prospect Theory Tversky
and Kahneman (1992), since high probabilities should generally be under-
weighted, nor by straightforward inequity aversion on outcomes only, since in
the risky option, ex post inequity is always maximal. Hence, under standard
assumptions regarding risk preferences, including the probability weighting
function, and inequity aversion, risk attitude should move towards higher
levels of risk aversion when the level of favorable inequity rises. This is
clearly not reflected in the data: the proportion of subjects taking the risky
option in T30 is significantly lower than in T45 (p < .001 for both Maxwell-
Suart’s marginal homogeneity test and Bhapkar’s W), although conventional
levels of significance are not reached with T40 and T35 vs. T45.
Notably, the U-shaped pattern seems to be asymmetric: the amount of
risky decisions appears higher in the case of unfavorable inequity for the de-
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cision maker than in the case of favorable inequity. Leaving the case of the
equal split aside for the moment, all comparisons between tasks correspond-
ing to sure payoffs adding up to 50 (T5 vs. T45, T10 vs. T40, T15 vs. T35,
and T20 vs. T30) suggest that the risky option is relatively more appealing
when the sure option implies unfavorable inequity: The differences are signif-
icant according to Maxwell-Stuart and Bhapkar’s W at the .05-level. By the
same token, comparing the number of times decision makers have chosen the
risky option in the four favorable situations against the same number in the
four unfavorable situations yields a significant difference (using a two-sided
Wilcoxon signed ranks test for matched observations: V = 1299.5, p = .02).
The apparent asymmetry between favorable and unfavorable situations
in risk attitude may be consistent with various aspects of individual atti-
tudes towards risk. For instance, the difference may in part be explained
within generalized expected utility models by probability weighting func-
tions known to be inverted S-shaped, in particular for T5/T45. In this
case, the comparison of choices in a social context and equivalent individual
choices should be identical. Remember that, in the second part of the ex-
periment, three tasks (T15i, T25i, T35i) were the exact counterparts of T15,
T25 and T35 in terms of payoffs and probabilities for the decision maker,
but stripped from the social context. Comparisons are displayed in figure 2,
and they suggest indeed systematic differences between decisions in social
and individual contexts.
In T15 vs. T15i, where the social situation is unfavorable to the decision
maker, individuals take significantly more risk than in the equivalent indi-
vidual lottery and this difference is strongly significant (p < .001 for both
Maxwell-Stuart’s and Bhapkar’s W). More surprisingly perhaps, the same
holds for the equal situation (T25 vs. T25i), where subjects take more risk
in the social lottery than in the individual one (p < .01 for both tests).3
However, in case of a favorable social context (T35 vs. T35i) the difference
is only weakly significant (Bhapkar’s W p < .10). This means that decision
maker not only takes more risks on average in an unfavorable situation than
in a favorable one, but that they also take more risk in an unfavorable social
situation than they would in the equivalent task without social implications.
To put it differently, decision makers seem to be affected by social context
when making a risky decision, but not in an homogeneous way: they take
more risk when the situation is unfavorable or equal, but less when it is
3Note though that this is mostly due to the larger number of indifference rather than
a shift to the risky option.
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Figure 2: Risky choices in social vs. individual contexts
favorable to them.
In order to test the robustness of these results, we ran an ordered logit
model with individual fixed effects on choices made in the nine social lotteries
(that is, the safe option, indifference or the risky one) and the three equiv-
alent individual tasks, using as independent variables the expected payoff
of the lottery and its squared root (in order to account for non-linearities),
and three dummy variables accounting for the context (equal, favorable, un-
favorable), the reference being being the individual tasks. The results are
displayed in Table 3. They confirm the earlier findings: decision makers take
more risks in unfavorable social situations and - although to a lesser extent
so in equal social situations than they take in purely individual decisions
under risk, whereas in favorable social situations they seem either not to be
affected by the social environment or to take slightly less risk.
To the extent that some of the findings reported above are surprising,
one could wonder whether perhaps the fact that only a fraction of subjects
were selected for real payment made the situation akin to a hypothetical
11
Choice Coef. SE Wald Z
Constant (≥ 0.5) 1.2748† .7734 1.65
Constant (≥ 1) .7302 .7725 .95
EP -.14*** .0328 -4.40
EP2 .003*** .0006 5.60
dummyequal 0.74** .3000 2.48
dummyfavourable -.35 .2789 -1.28
dummyunfavourable 1.16*** .2719 4.29
† =significant at the .10 level, *= significant at the .05 level, **= significant at the .01
level, ***= significant at the .001 level. Pseudo−R2 = 0.34, L.R. χ2 = 313.68 (df 86),
p < .001
Table 3: Ordered logit with individual fixed effects
game and reduced subjects’ effort to choose carefully. However, the dictator
games (where behavior is supposedly strongly affected by the presence of real
incentives) gave findings very similar to those in the literature, especially
those of Krawczyk and Le Lec (2010): a substantive share of people give
a little, be it in money or in probability, and they give less in the latter
than in the former in terms of expected payoffs (means of 10.02 euros in
money and 15.11 percent in chance (i.e., 7.55 expected euros); a two-sided
Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing the two suggest a significant difference
(p < .01). As the summary statistics of the dictator decisions are similar to
those in the existing literature, we conclude that our main results are not
driven by the random lottery mechanism applied in the experiment.
3.2 Individual patterns
One of the limitations of our analysis so far is that these apparent findings
concern aggregate data, and as such may be driven by individual heterogene-
ity of subjects, which may explain a rather surprising overall picture. One
aspect in which subjects might differ a lot is whether they are socially ori-
ented, i.e., other-regarding (inequity averse, altruistic, etc.). Categorizing
selfish and pro-social subjects on the basis of a median split on their offer
in the dictator game can shed some light on the data. Interestingly, the ap-
parent risk seeking behavior in the unfavorable social situations seems to be
driven by subjects who behaved selfishly in the dictator game: the difference
between T15 and T15i is significant there, with p < .01 for Maxwell-Stuart
and Bhapkar’s W, whereas it is not for relatively pro-social subjects. Yet, no
such effect can be found for the other possible comparisons: T25 and T25i
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are different for both the selfish and the pro-social subjects (p < .10 for
both tests), and the difference between T35 and T35i is not significant for
either group. Overall, this suggests that the more risk-seeking behavior in
the unfavorable social situation may be mostly driven by ‘selfish’ subjects.
Notice however that ‘selfish’ may be a misnomer; a fraction of apparently
selfish subjects may in fact be competitive, both types being confounded in
the dictator game.
In order to check for heterogeneity and to get a more precise picture of in-
dividual patterns, we ran a k-medians cluster analysis on all social lotteries
dividing the subjects into three clusters. This leads to the following charac-
terization: the first class of types is composed of 20 individuals who exhibit
a very dichotomous pattern of risk attitude in the social context (strongly
risk-seeking in the unfavorable case, and risk-averse in the favorable one),
the second one (41 subjects) is rather overall risk-averse, and the final one
(21 individuals) show a relatively stable attitude towards risk, except in the
case of high probabilities of winning (T35, T40, T45). The data by types
are shown in Fig. 3.
Figure 3: Choices in social lotteries by types
This categorization of subjects helps explain the aggregate pattern: the
overall asymmetry in risky behavior across favorable and unfavorable sit-
uations seems to be mostly (but not only) driven by type-1 individuals.
Furthermore, the puzzling surge in risk-seeking behavior when the situation
becomes more and more socially favorable can almost entirely be accounted
for by type-3 participants. In other words, the clear U-shape trend does not
seem to correspond to a particular individual pattern. However, whereas the
asymmetry in risk attitude between advantageous and disadvantageous in-
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equity could be explained by social reference points (and so can the behavior
of type 1 subjects), the more risky choices in extremely favorable situations
for type 3 participants are not easy to explain, especially since no correlation
was found between being of type 3 and other experimental variables (such as
the order of the tasks, the level of risk aversion, etc.) or socio-demographic
variables. A possible explanation is that there may be some individuals who
tend to systematically overestimate high probabilities. It is well known that
probability weighting functions exhibit substantial variance at the individual
level and that the usual inverted S-shape corresponds only to the median or
average decision maker. In favor of this interpretation, we find that as many
as 57% of type-3 subjects choose the risky option in T35i, to be compared
with 67% in T35, a non-significant difference. It seems that the increase in
risk taking observed for type-3 subjects is likely not to be linked to a specific
effect of the social context, but more to a general attitude towards risk in
this range of probabilities.
Figure 4: Choices in social/individual lotteries by type
The strong effect of social context on risk taking in type-1 subjects as is
suggested by Fig. 4 is confirmed by statistical tests: T15 and T15i differ
strongly (p < .001 for Maxwell-Stuart and Bhapkar’s W), giving weight to
the idea that these subjects take more risk in socially unfavorable situations.
Conversely, T35 turns out to be significantly smaller than T35i (p < .05 in
both tests), a change in behavior under risk when the situation is favorable.
It also seems that T25 and T25i differ (p < .10 for Maxwell-Stuart and
p < .05 for Bhapkar’s W), and that in equal situations, type-1 subjects do
take more risk.
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Interestingly, though weaker, these results seem to hold for type-2 subjects
too: choices are different for T15 and T15i (p < .05 for Maxwell-Stuart,
p < .01 for Bhapkar’s W), and for T25 and T25i (p < .05 for both tests),
although the picture is less clear for T35 and T35i (p = .20 for Maxwell-
Stuart and p = .12 for Bhapkar’s W). It looks as if the same pattern prevails
in both types but that it is more intense for the first type. When merging
the two types, the three differences discussed above are strongly significant
(p < .01 for all tests but Maxwell-Stuart between T35 and T35i, where
p < .01 and for T15 and its individual equivalent where p < .001).
To sum up, it seems that many subjects exhibit the following pattern:
they tend to take more risks in both unfavorable and in equal situations than
in equivalent individual contexts, and they are more risk-averse in socially
favorable situations. This pattern is particularly strong for a substantive
share (a quarter) of our subjects. They choose the uncertain option when
in an unfavorable situation, and they choose the safe one in a favorable one.
In other words, this share of our subjects exhibit risk attitudes that are very
much affected by social context, and they seem to be the extreme case of a
rather frequent behavior (types 1 and 2, or equivalently three quarters of all
subjects).
4 Discussion
Overall, our results suggest that individuals’ attitude towards risk is
strongly affected by the social context: We observe systematic deviations in
social situation from what decision makers decide in similar situations with-
out any possibility for social comparisons. In particular, they take more risk
when the other participant is ahead, and less when the other is behind. Our
data pattern is consistent with findings in Bolton and Ockenfels (2010), and
it would also be in line with an extended version of Prospect Theory to social
contexts, where the other’s payoff would play the role of the reference point,
as developed by Linde and Sonnemans (2012a). Such a reasoning could also
help explain the data by Haisley, Mostafa, and Loewenstein (2008), who
showed that when reminded of their low status, low income individuals were
more likely to engage in risky purchase such as lottery tickets.
One of the, at first sight, counter-intuitive results in our paper is that sub-
jects seem to take more risk in an equal social context (T25) than in a purely
individual one (T25i). A possible explanation may be found in the results of
Bault, Coricelli, and Rustichini (2008), who put forth the fact that gloating,
i.e. the utility of being ahead of the other, is in absolute value stronger than
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envy, i.e. the disutility of being behind. According to the authors, attitudes
to gain and losses reverse in a social context: Whereas in its standard ver-
sion, the theory implies that losses are valued more in absolute terms than
gains, it may be that the opposite holds in social contexts; that is, relative
gains may be subjectively valued more strongly than relative losses. Such an
interpretation would straightforwardly explain why subjects are more risk
seeking in a socially equal situation than in the payoff-equivalent individual
one.4
Attitudes to gains and losses reversing in a social context may in part
explain the discrepancy between, on the one hand, our results and those
of Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) and, on the other hand, the findings in
Linde and Sonnemans (2012a). In the latter paper, the authors did not
use social lotteries that gave the decision maker the opportunity to switch
relative positions with the receiver (from being behind to being ahead), but
at best the possibility to reach the same level of payoffs. If being ahead
is what is really prized by subjects, there is little motivation in Linde and
Sonnemanns’s tasks to take risks, since it is impossible to overtake the other
participant by choosing the risky option. An alternative version of this
interpretation is that ‘winning’ – that is, earning more than the counterpart,
independently of the absolute payoff difference – generates a psychological
bonus: What is prized is not really the favorable difference between the
decision maker and the receiver, but simply whether the decision maker
has ‘won’ the bet. In this case, there is no reason anymore to take risks
in favorable tasks, and such an explanation is consistent with the general
pattern we observe.5
Another explanation needs two ingredients: First, individuals could have
a tendency to take more risk in general in social contexts than in individual
ones6, and, second, individuals are more risk-seeking in socially unfavorable
4To see that, consider a very simple version with u(x, y) = λv(x−y) in the relative gain
domain, and u(x, y) = −v(y−x) in the relative loss domain, v being concave on R+, λ ≥ 1.
When considering decisions in task T25, the utility of both options are the following: for
the safe one it is v(25−25) = 0, whereas for the risky one we get λ 1
2
v(50)− 1
2
v(50), which
is positive for any λ > 1.
5Such a reasoning can be seen as a social version of aspiration level theory, developed
by Diecidue and van de Ven (2008).
6This might also be a consequence of our design: The risky option may look more
appealing to some subjects in the social case than in the individual case, simply because
in the social lottery, the bad outcome may not, from a social preference point of view, be
seen as equally bad as in the individual one. Altruistic or efficiency-driven considerations
in this case could explain why gambling in the social case is slightly more attractive than
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situations, not affected in socially equal situations, and more risk-averse in
socially favorable contexts. The two effects, once combined, would imply
a pattern consistent with our findings: in unfavorable situations where the
two effects point in the same direction, individuals become strongly more
risk-seeking, as we observe it; in equal ones, they would become mildly more
risk-seeking because of the first effect (and the second one is neutral); and
eventually the effect would be mixed for the favorable lotteries or slightly
in the direction of more risk aversion, the second effect being stronger than
the first, as we observe in our results.
5 Conclusion
Our data suggest that elicited risk attitude is influenced by the relative
social situation of the decision maker: More risk is taken in unfavorable
situations, and (slightly) less in favorable situations. A substantive share of
our subjects (a quarter) exhibit this pattern in an extreme way: they almost
always choose the risky option when in an unfavorable situation, and almost
always choose the safe option in a favorable context. We also find evidence
of additional risk seeking in socially equal contexts. In addition, it seems
that such a pattern of behavior also holds for a majority of subjects, yet in
a less extreme way.
The finding that on average people take more risk in social contexts than in
individual ones sheds light on the social dynamics of excessive risk taking, es-
pecially in organizations. Consider for instance a principal-agent-situations
with one principal and several agents, e.g. a single employer and several
employees, a shareholder and several executives, etc. Then, a divergence in
risky behavior between the principal and the agents who are, in contrast
to the principal, embedded in a social context is possible according to our
results. Such a divergence is not the consequence of different risk attitudes
but purely a consequence of the social context. Given our results, the social
effect on average clearly goes in the direction of excessive risk taking. More
specifically, take a bank or in an investment fund: within the group of agents
some are going to fare better than others, especially if the former have taken
more risks than the latter. The resulting socially unfavorable situation for
the latter may lead them to take more risks, establishing an even higher ref-
erence level that makes others also take excessive risks, leading to a vicious
in the individual one. Furthermore, it could also be the mere fact of being observed by
another participant who by design would see the other’s choice that is affecting the results.
In contrast, the choice in individual lotteries is by design not affected by such peer effects.
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circle with probably higher returns but, eventually, unacceptable risks and,
finally, potentially spectacular bankruptcies.
Our experimental results suggest that the role of social context may be
critical in understanding organizational and financial excesses in risk taking.
We are able to provide a first idea of the important forces behind potentially
excessive risk taking as a consequence of the social context. Future studies
could test specific theoretical models of excessive risk taking that embed
the risky situation into a social environment. More comprehensive tests of
individual risk attitudes could allow to also address the underlying reasons
for potentially excessive risk taking in the social. For instance, estimating
individual probability weighting would allow for addressing the influence of
this channel on decision making under risk in a social situation. Further,
the social situation could be varied in different dimensions (such as the level
of competition, the size of the references group, etc.), not only along the
outcome dimension. Without doubt, there is more research required, but
it is important to know - following our results - that the social context
matters and that there are certain aspects (such as the relative position
within a reference group) that seem to play a crucial role in shaping elicited
risk attitudes in social situations.
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APPENDIX: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
In this experiment you can earn money. It consists of two completely independent
parts. You will find the instructions and decison sheets for part 1 attached (pages 2-
4) and receive part 2 after completion of part 1. To keep your decisions anonymous,
you receive an identification number, which is indicated in the upper right part of
this page. Please tear off this number and keep it in a safe place. Please do not
talk to your neighbors from now on and fill in the following sheets. Please read the
instructions carefully! Raise your hand if you have any questions.
1. Part 1
Please imagine you have received 50 euros and you have to give a share of it
to another anonymous person in the room. Between the three options A, B and
C, please choose the option that you personally find best by ticking one of the
three grey boxes below ”Your choice” for each of the 10 scenarios! Please read the
text below the scenarios BEFORE you decide! Note that scenario 10 is structurally
different from scenarios 1-9.
(1) Scenario: Choose between A, B and C:
(a) I give 5 euros to the anonymous person and keep 45 euros.
(b) I give the other person a 10% chance of receiving the 50 euros. With
a probability of 90% I will keep the 50 euros.
(c) I don’t care. (Option A or B are chosen randomly.)
(2) Scenario: Choose between A, B and C:
(a) I give 10 euros to the anonymous person and keep 40 euros.
(b) I give the other person a 20% chance of receiving the 50 euros. With
a probability of 80% I will keep the 50 euros.
(c) I don’t care. (Option A or B are chosen randomly.)
(3) Scenario: Choose between A, B and C:
(a) I give 15 euros to the anonymous person and keep 35 euros.
(b) I give the other person a 30% chance of receiving the 50 euros. With
a probability of 70% I will keep the 50 euros.
(c) I don’t care. (Option A or B are chosen randomly.)
(4) Scenario: Choose between A, B and C:
(a) I give 20 euros to the anonymous person and keep 30 euros.
(b) I give the other person a 40% chance of receiving the 50 euros. With
a probability of 60% I will keep the 50 euros.
(c) I don’t care. (Option A or B are chosen randomly.)
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(5) Scenario: Choose between A, B and C:
(a) I give 25 euros to the anonymous person and keep 25 euros.
(b) I give the other person a 50% chance of receiving the 50 euros. With
a probability of 50% I will keep the 50 euros.
(c) I don’t care. (Option A or B are chosen randomly.)
(6) Scenario: Choose between A, B and C:
(a) I give 30 euros to the anonymous person and keep 20 euros.
(b) I give the other person a 60% chance of receiving the 50 euros. With
a probability of 40% I will keep the 50 euros.
(c) I don’t care. (Option A or B are chosen randomly.)
(7) Scenario: Choose between A, B and C:
(a) I give 35 euros to the anonymous person and keep 15 euros.
(b) I give the other person a 70% chance of receiving the 50 euros. With
a probability of 30% I will keep the 50 euros.
(c) I don’t care. (Option A or B are chosen randomly.)
(8) Scenario: Choose between A, B and C:
(a) I give 40 euros to the anonymous person and keep 10 euros.
(b) I give the other person a 80% chance of receiving the 50 euros. With
a probability of 20% I will keep the 50 euros.
(c) I don’t care. (Option A or B are chosen randomly.)
(9) Scenario: Choose between A, B and C:
(a) I give 45 euros to the anonymous person and keep 5 euros.
(b) I give the other person a 90% chance of receiving the 50 euros. With
a probability of 10% I will keep the 50 euros.
(c) I don’t care. (Option A or B are chosen randomly.)
(10) Scenario: Decide for A, B AND C:
(a) I do not have to give away anything of my 50 euros. However, I can
give a share to the anonymous person in the room voluntarily. The
anonymous person has NOT received 50 euros. What amount (in eu-
ros between 0 and 50) would you voluntarily give to the anonymous
person?
(b) I do not have to give away anything of my 50 euros. However, I can
give a share to the anonymous person in the room voluntarily. The
anonymous person has NOT received 50 euros. What chance (in %
probability between 0 and 100) would you voluntarily give the anony-
mous person to receive the 50 euros?
(c) Which of the two options, A or B, would you prefer? Please tick a box.
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At the end of the lecture we will choose 8 persons randomly from all the persons
in the room (with help of the random generator on the computer). The first 4 per-
sons are randomly assigned to the role of the one that received 50 euros (decider).
The other 4 persons are then in the role of the receiver. Decider 1 decides what
amount receiver 1 receives, decider 2 decides, what amount receiver 2 receives etc.
For each pair” we will choose randomly one of the 10 upper scenarios (by rolling a
10-sided die). This scenario determines then the gain of the two persons (if option
C is chosen, the die will be rolled again - for the numbers 1-5, A is chosen; for the
numbers 6-10, B is chosen).
Let’s assume you have been drawn as ”decider” and the 2nd scenario is randomly
chosen to be paid. If you have chosen A, you will receive 40 euros and the other
person will receive 10 euros. If you have chosen B, you will roll a 10-sided die in
front of our eyes. If you throw a 1 or a 2 (20% probability) the other person will
receive the entire 50 euros. If you throw a number from 3 to 10 you will receive the
entire 50 euros. Analogue for the other options.
If scenario 10 is chosen, a random mechanism (the random generator of the
computer) will first choose between A, B and C. Then the amount, that the decider
has chosen, is directly transferred to the receiver (if option A was chosen) or the
die is rolled corresponding to the chosen probability, respectively (if option B is
chosen). If the random decision yields option C, the indicated option - A or B -
is valid. As you don’t know whether you will be chosen, which role you will be
assigned if so and which scenario will be paid, it makes sense to think carefully
about each decision. The payment will be conducted separately and anonymously
at the end of the lecture. I.e., you will not know with which decider/receiver you
were paired afterwards. PLEASE DECIDE NOW FOR THE SCENARIOS 1 TO
10. Raise your hand if you have any questions.
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2. Part 2 [handed out after completion of Part 1]
Again you have to choose between different scenarios. This time, there are 9
scenarios. Please choose from the three options A, B or C the one that you personally
find best by ticking one of the three grey boxes beneath ”Your choice” for each of
the 9 scenarios! Please read the text below the scenarios BEFORE you make your
decision!
(1) Scenario: Choose between A, B and C:
(a) A 50% chance of receiving 25 euros and a 50% chance of receiving 20
euros.
(b) A 50% chance of receiving 47.5 euros and a 50% chance of receiving
1.25 euros.
(c) I don’t care. (Option A or B are chosen randomly.)
(2) Scenario: Choose between A, B and C:
(a) A 60% chance of receiving 25 euros and a 40% chance of receiving 20
euros.
(b) A 60% chance of receiving 47.5 euros and a 40% chance of receiving
1.25 euros.
(c) I don’t care. (Option A or B are chosen randomly.)
(3) Scenario: Choose between A, B and C:
(a) A 70% chance of receiving 25 euros and a 30% chance of receiving 20
euros.
(b) A 70% chance of receiving 47.5 euros and a 30% chance of receiving
1.25 euros.
(c) I don’t care. (Option A or B are chosen randomly.)
(4) Scenario: Choose between A, B and C:
(a) 0 euros for sure.
(b) A 30% chance of losing 12.5 euros and a 70% chance of receiving 12.5
euros.
(c) I don’t care. (Option A or B are chosen randomly.)
(5) Scenario: Choose between A, B and C:
(a) 0 euros for sure.
(b) A 40% chance of losing 12.5 euros and a 60% chance of receiving 12.5
euros.
(c) I don’t care. (Option A or B are chosen randomly.)
(6) Scenario: Choose between A, B and C:
(a) 0 euros for sure.
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(b) A 50% chance of losing 12.5 euros and a 50% chance of receiving 12.5
euros.
(c) I don’t care. (Option A or B are chosen randomly.)
(7) Scenario: Choose between A, B and C:
(a) 15 euros for sure.
(b) A 30% chance of receiving 50 euros and a 70% chance of receiving 0
euros.
(c) I don’t care. (Option A or B are chosen randomly.)
(8) Scenario: Choose between A, B and C:
(a) 25 euros for sure.
(b) A 50% chance of receiving 50 euros and a 50% chance of receiving 0
euros.
(c) I don’t care. (Option A or B are chosen randomly.)
(9) Scenario: Choose between A, B and C:
(a) 35 euros for sure.
(b) A 70% chance of receiving 50 euros and a 30% chance of receiving 0
euros.
(c) I don’t care. (Option A or B are chosen randomly.)
At the end of the lecture we will choose 4 persons in the room randomly (with
the help of the random generator on the computer.) Those will be different 4 per-
sons than the ones chosen for part 1. For each of the 4 persons we will choose one
of the 9 upper scenarios randomly (with the random generator of the computer).
This is then relevant for the gain of the person concerned (if C has been chosen the
die is rolled again - if a number from 1 to 5 is thrown, A is valid; if a number from
6-10 is thrown, B is valid).
Let’s assume for example that you have been chosen randomly to be paid for the
second scenario. If you have chosen A you will roll a 10 sided die in front of our eyes.
If you throw a number from 1 to 6 (60% probability) you receive 25 euros. If you
throw a number from 7 to 10, you receive 20 euros. Analogue for the other options.
As you don’t know whether you will be chosen, which role you will be assigned if
so and which scenario will be paid, it makes sense to think carefully about each
decision. The payment will be conducted separately and anonymously at the end
of the lecture. I.e., you will not know with which decider/receiver you were paired
afterwards.
PLEASE NOTE: Possible losses have to be covered out of your own pocket.
PLEASE DECIDE NOW FOR THE SCENARIOS 1 TO 9. AS SOON AS YOU
ARE DONE, YOU CAN START FILLING IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE. AFTER
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THIS THE EXPERIMENT ENDS.
Raise your hand if you have any questions.
3. QUESTIONNAIRE
Thank you for your participation!
We ask you to fill in this short questionnaire truthfully.
Age:
Gender: m f
Major:
On a scale from 1 (very risk averse) to 7 (very risk loving), how would you
describe yourself? (1 to 7)
Nationality:
Do you smoke regularly (more than one packet per week)? yes no
Do you play the lottery regularly (more than once a month)? yes no
Do you gamble on the internet (Poker, . . . )? yes no
List your three favorite sports (ranked in order) that you practice regularly
(1)
(2)
(3)
(if you practice less than 3 sports leave the fields blank)
Thank you very much again for your participation!
